Recently, Bana and Comon-Lundh [7] introduced the notion of computationally complete symbolic attacker to deliver unconditional computational soundness to symbolic protocol verification. First we explain the relationship between their technique and Fitting's embedding of classical logic into S4 [23] . Then, based on predicates for "key usability", we provide an axiomatic system in their framework to handle secure encryption when keys are allowed to be sent. We examine both IND-CCA2 and KDM-CCA2 encryptions, both symmetric and asymmetric situations. For unforgeability, we consider INT-CTXT encryptions. This technique does not require the usual limitations of computational soundness such as the absence of dynamic corruption, the absence of key-cycles or unambiguous parsing of bit strings. In particular, if a key-cycle possibly corrupts CCA2 encryption, our technique delivers an attack. If it does not endanger security, the security proof goes through. We illustrate how our notions can be applied in protocol proofs.
INTRODUCTION
Approaches to computationally sound automated verification of security protocols can be divided into two groups. Works in one [3, 20, 4, 17, 24] define symbolic adversaries, and soundness theorems state that under certain circumstances, if there is no successful symbolic attack, then there is no successful computational attack either. The other group aims to work directly in the computational model [21, 14, 9, 10, 8] . In this latter case, computational soundness means that the properties on which symbolic manipulations are conditioned hold computationally.
The first group, where a symbolic attacker is defined, gives hope that already existing automated tools may be adopted for computationally sound verification, but these soundness theorems require large sets of assumptions. A number of assumptions, as well as reasons why they are not realistic are discussed in [18] . Such assumptions are, for example, that bit strings can be unambiguously parsed into symbolic terms, or, that no key cycles occur, or, that all keys are honestly generated, or, that there is no dynamic corruption. Recently, Backes et al. in [2] showed a way to avoid some of these problems such as key-cycles and badly generated keys, but for the computational implementation of the encryption, they needed to require a very strong notion called PROG-KDM security. Moreover, they still used an entire page to list all the further necessary conditions (such as unambiguous parsing) limiting the computational implementation that they needed for soundness. But PROG-KDM security and the other conditions are necessary only to receive computational guarantees for their symbolic analysis even if computational security of the analyzed protocol holds without these requirements. Their strong conditions are imposed on the computational implementation not for the security of the protocol, but for the soundness of the analysis.
Recently, Bana and Comon-Lundh (BC) presented in [7] a new kind of symbolic attacker. They called it computationally complete symbolic adversary, as it is capable of doing everything that a computational adversary is capable of. They observed that the discrepancy between symbolic and computational proofs emerges from the following fact: While the usual computational security assumptions on the primitives (such as IND-CCA2 security of the encryption) define what the adversary cannot violate (and the secu-rity of the protocol is derived from the security of the primitives), symbolic adversaries are defined by listing all the adversarial capabilities (Dolev-Yao rules). Hence, to adjust the viewpoint of the symbolic analysis to that of the computational, instead of listing every kind of moves a symbolic adversary is allowed to do, Bana and Comon-Lundh list a few rules (axioms) that the symbolic adversary is not allowed to violate. Anything that does not contradict these axioms is allowed for the adversary. Hence, a successful symbolic attack in their case means that the violation of the security property of the protocol is consistent with the axioms. The axioms that are introduced must be computationally sound with respect to the computational interpretation they defined. Their general soundness result is the following: Suppose that the computational implementation satisfies a set of axioms. If there is a successful PPT attacker for which the number of sessions it exploits does not increase indefinitely as the security parameter increases (there is a bound, but it can be arbitrarily high), then there is also a successful symbolic adversary complying with the set of axioms.
The difference between the original Dolev-Yao (DY) technique and that of BC can be best understood from the following pictures. In the DY technique, as more and more rules are added, the symbolic adversarial capabilities are increasing, the symbolic adversary covers more and more of the computational capabilities. However, no-one has been able to come up with rules that properly cover all possible computational capabilities. As Figure 1 shows, there are always some computational capabilities that are not covered by the DY ones. All computational soundness results that use the DY symbolic adversaries in the end have to impose some significant limitations on the computational implementation.
In the BC approach, without axioms, the symbolic adversary is allowed to do anything. As axioms are added, the symbolic adversary's capabilities are decreasing. Their main theorem is that if the axioms are computationally sound, the symbolic adversarial capabilities cover all of the computational adversarial capabilities that use bounded number of sessions. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . Clearly, if the symbolic adversary is too strong, security of protocols cannot be proven. Therefore, the aim is to create a library of axioms that are sound and are sufficient to prove actual protocols.
In [5] , Bana et al. introduced several modular, computationally sound axioms, and verified secrecy and authentication of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol to illustrate that the technique can indeed be used to verify actual protocols. However, as Backes et al. have pointed out in [2] , the axioms in [5] were not suitable when decryption keys were sent around in the course of the protocol (under encryptions for example, in a key distribution). The current work aims to address this problem.
Before we describe this current work in detail, it is worth asking ourselves, does it really make sense to develop a new technique when such tools as CryptoVerif and EasyCrypt exist? However, EasyCrypt at its current stage is more for proving properties about primitives, such as CCA2 security from hardness assumptions; it is not suitable for more complex protocols. CryptoVerif is a very powerful tool for protocol analysis, but if it fails to prove a protocol, other than its developer, it is difficult for a user to know what to do. The aim of the BC technique is to construct a relatively simple, intuitive system. If we remove the explanations, the axioms in this paper are just a few lines, perhaps half a page, and most of them are trivial. The BC technique is still lightweight compared to CryptoVerif or EasyCrypt. BC does not use explicit probabilities, neither game reductions. Proofs are readable to human, convenient for human interaction if automated. NSL and the and the symmetric Needham-Schroeder protocols were proven by hand, without any assumption on parsing unambiguity. Available other proofs of the NSL protocol including the one with CryptoVerif all assume unambiguous parsing. The NSL proof with this technique reduces to 2-3 pages with unambiguous parsing. For an initial decidability result, see Comon et al. [19] .
Our Work
In this paper we tackle the problem of key exchange, but along the way we also present various other improvements on the original work of Bana and Comon-Lundh. In their original work [7] , the general soundness theorem worked only for certain kinds of first-order formulas, and the non-negligible subsets of the computational execution had to satisfy a certain computability property. Later, in the online version of their paper [6] they presented improved computational semantics for the disjunction and existential quantification, and with that they could make the general soundness proof work for any first-order formula. But they still needed the computability condition on the non-negligible subsets (not an important limitation though, but not pretty). In this work, we remove this limitation with a trick in the soundness proof.
Bana and Comon-Lundh proved their general soundness theorem directly from their definitions. This involved showing that although computational semantics of their compound formulas are not defined as usual in Tarskian semantics, first-order deduction rules and axioms are valid with respect to their semantics too. As it turns out, this actually follows from Fitting's theorem of embedding firstorder logic into first-order S4 [23] . After introducing the basics, we detail this relationship in the current work, and show how the BC general soundness theorem follows from Fitting's theorem.
In order to tackle key exchange, the necessary element to incorporate in the framework is key usability, an idea introduced in [22] for a different framework. This notion is meant to express whether a properly generated key, at a certain point of the protocol execution, is still usable for secure encryption or whether it has been compromised. If a decryption key (or just a key in the symmetric case) is sent in the clear, the encryption key associated to it cannot be used for secure encryption any more. Or, a key that was sent in a key cycle, may also have lost its capability to encrypt securely if the encryption scheme is only IND-CCA2 secure. More generally, keys can also be compromised in more subtle, non-trace fashion.
For overall consistency of notation, instead of key usability we introduce the opposite, namely key compromise as a predicate. We define key compromise predicates both for symmetric and asymmetric encryptions, both for IND-CCA2 [12] and KDM-CCA2 [1, 15] cases, and also for INT-CTXT [13] unforgeability. There is an essential difference from the way key usability was defined in [22] , we explain that at our definition. (Furthermore, the axioms in [22] were introduced to work for the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange, they are not helpful with other protocols.)
Further essential innovations of this paper are predicates representing adversarial derivability (computability) with oracle access. This makes the axioms simpler than just using derivability as in [5] . Depending on whether IND-CCA2 or KDM-CCA2 oracles are used, and on whether the encryption is symmetric or asymmetric, we define four such derivability with oracle access predicates.
We introduce axioms and show that they are computationally sound. The axioms are suitable for (but not limited to) inductive reasoning: if something is uncompromised up-to a point, then certain newly sent messages do not destroy this property. They are also entirely modular: Introducing further primitives will not destroy the soundness of these axioms, they do not have to be proved again. If we want to prove a protocol that uses further primitives such as signatures besides encryption, then we only have to introduce new axioms for the new primitives. For encryption, the current axioms can still be used unchanged. Hence, a library of axioms can be gradually developed by adding more and more axioms.
A nice feature of our new predicates for key usability and derivability with oracles is that we only have a single axiom requiring CCA2 security of the encryption: the axiom stating that fresh keys are uncompromised (with respect to CCA2 security). The rest of the axioms, such as the one expressing that encryption with uncompromised key hides the plaintext, or the one expressing nonmalleability are immediate consequences of the computational semantics of the derivability and key-compromise predicates.
We emphasize that we introduce axioms for KDM-CCA2 security to be able to analyze protocols for which KDM security is computationally necessary: Unlike [2] , in our case, for those protocols that do not require KDM security for their computational soundness, the use of our IND-CCA2 axioms is sufficient.
After presenting the axioms and their soundness proofs, we look at three simple examples in Section 11 to illustrate how the axioms work with special focus on comparing how the IND-CCA2 and the KDM-CCA2 axioms are applied to key cycles. We show security in a case when there are no key cycles, then we present a case when there is a key cycle and the IND-CCA2 axioms provide an attack while KDM-CCA2 axioms still prove security. Finally we show a case when there is a key cycle, but as it is under another encryption it does not danger security even in the IND-CCA2 case and the security proof goes through. We also show that the axioms in [5] without key compromise are not sufficient to treat these examples.
Finally, we present the result of our proof of the Amended Symmetric Needham-Schroeder Protocol. This protocol first distributes a session key, and then uses the distributed key to share a secret. Using the IND-CCA2 and INT-CTXT axioms, we proved that the key is securely distributed, that the shared nonce remains secret, and that agreement and authentication hold. It is posted online at the first author's homepage.
The technique of [7] and also this work allows to avoid all restrictions mentioned before on the computational world. Once a protocol is proven secure in our symbolic model with respect to a set of axioms, then all properties that the computational implementation has to satisfy for computational security are included in the axioms. Any number of bad keys are allowed to be generated by the adversary; any number of corrupted, uncorrupted, or dynamically corrupted parties can be present. As for parsing of bit strings into terms, previous soundness results relied on unambiguous parsing. Within this framework, there is no need for such an assumption. We do not even need the condition that encryptions, pairing are length regular (i.e. encryption, pairing of inputs that have the same length output bit strings of the same length).
As long as indistinguishability properties are not concerned, the only significant restriction remains that the technique is not capable to detect computational attacks for which the PPT attacker needs the number of sessions to grow indefinitely as the security parameter increases. (It is the general soundness theorem that requires bounded number of sessions, not the axioms.) However, the usual Dolev-Yao technique is not capable of doing this either. (ProVerif for example is unbounded only in the sense that it works for arbitrary number of sessions, but still, if an attack is found, that, and the corresponding computational attack uses a given number of sessions independently of the security parameter.) Nevertheless, it would still be nice to have conditions under which the absence of successful symbolic BC adversaries means that there are no computational attacks even if unbounded number of sessions are allowed. For example, if only CCA2 encryptions and pairings are used to construct messages, we believe that this statement holds. Analysis of this is left for future work.
The contributions of this paper include (i) relating the BC technique to Fitting's embedding, (ii) syntax and computational semantics of key compromise and derivability with oracle access, (iii) a library of axioms for symmetric and asymmetric IND-CCA2 and KDM-CCA2 encryptions and INT-CTXT encryptions as well, (iv) soundness result of the axioms, (v) short examples to illustrate how the axioms are used with an emphasis on key-cycles, (vi) summary of the verification of the symmetric Needham-Schroeder protocol with this tool as a proof of concept. (The NSL proof in [5] can also be done with the current set of axioms the same way as it was done there, with minor modifications only.)
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give the intuitive description of our new predicates. In Section 3, we present our first-order language, which is an extension of that of BC. We then summarize in Sections 4 and 5 how Bana and Comon treated the symbolic and computational executions in [7] , define computational semantics, and present the general soundness theorem. In Section 6, we show how the BC technique is related to Fitting's embedding of classical logic in S4, and show how the general soundness result of Bana and Comon-Lundh follows from Fitting's theorem. Section 7 is devoted to the semantics of the new derivability predicates with oracles and their axioms, and Section 8 is the same for key usability. In Section 9 we discuss congruence of the equality predicate. In Section 10 we state and prove our soundness theorem for the axioms. In Section 11, we show a few simple examples of how inconsistency of certain formulas with the axioms can be proven. Finally, in Section 12, we state the result of the verification of the amended symmetric NS protocol with our tool.
We thank Pedro Adão, Bruno Blanchet, Rohit Chadha and Hubert Comon for helpful suggestions and valuable discussions.
DERIVABILITY, KEY COMPROMISE
The most important new aspect of the symbolic execution in [7] was to replace the DY technique's fixed definition of what the symbolic adversary can deduce, x1, ..., xn y, with a derivability predicate 1 x1, ..., xn £ y for which the symbolic semantics is not fixed. Namely, while in the DY technique, x1, ..., xn y meant that using only the DY rules y can be computed from x1, ..., xn, in the BC case x1, ..., xn £y is given some unfixed symbolic interpretation in an abstract model M for which they only require to satisfy some (computationally sound) axioms. That is, the axioms express what the symbolic adversary cannot violate. They do imply that from DY deducibility, satisfaction of the derivability predicate follows, for example, {y}K , K £ y. But in the BC system these rules are not what the adversary can at most do, but what it can certainly at least do (in other words, the adversary is not allowed to be unable to do it). The idea is that symbolic interpretation of x1, ..., xn £ y should be at least as powerful as computability of y from x1, ..., xn by some probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, and so the only limitations that we want to put on symbolic satisfaction of £ are limitations that are derived from computational computability.
One of the major innovations we propose here is that axioms become simpler if we allow the use of some oracles for the adversary. For example, considering IND-CCA2 public key encryption, it is better to introduce a new derivability predicate, x1, ..., xn £ aic2 y with the computational semantics meaning that the interpretation of y can be derived from the interpretation of x1, ..., xn by a PPT adversary with the help of decryption oracles that decrypt everything that are not results of encryptions on the left hand side. Similarly, for the symmetric case, we can introduce x1, ..., xn £ sic2 y meaning that y can be derived from x1, ..., xn with the help of decryption oracles and encryption oracles. That is, the algorithm trying to compute y from the x1, ..., xn is allowed to submit strings to the oracles for encryption and also for decryption. The decryption oracle decrypts as long as the submitted string is not an encryption from x1, ..., xn or an encryption produced by the encryption oracle. The encryption oracles here are needed, because the adversary cannot himself do encryptions (he does not know the key), and for this reason the IND-CCA2 definition for symmetric encryption allows the submission to the encryption oracle multiple times. In fact, for uniformity, we allow it for the public case too, as IND-CCA2 is equivalent for the case of multiple submissions to encryption oracles [11] . Similarly, we will also define derivation with oracle accessibility for KDM-CCA2 encryptions, which is somewhat more tricky. But encryption oracles using which keys? The answer is, keys honestly generated by the agents during the execution. We will use the notation £ O for such derivability with O being either aic2, sic2, akc2, skc2 or nothing, depending on whether we want asymmetric or symmetric IND-CCA2 oracles, or asymmetric or symmetric KDM-CCA2 oracles, or no oracles. (O is Fraktur O.)
Our next innovation is key usability for the case when keys are sent around. More precisely, to match the notation of derivability, we consider key compromise, which is the negation of key usability. We use the notation x1, ..., xn O K, where O again indexes whether we are talking about IND-CCA2, KDM-CCA2, symmetric or asymmetric encryption (there is always some oracle here). The intuitive meaning is that if x1, ..., xn are given to the adversary with access to the given oracles, then K becomes compromised, encryption with K is not secure against the adversary any more. For example, K, x2
O K, the other way is not necessarily true. Nevertheless the two properties, as we will see, behave very similarly, so we chose similar notation for them. We also consider key usability for INT-CTXT unforgeability.
LANGUAGE
The core of the framework used in this paper was introduced by Bana and Comon-Lundh in [7] . Along with our new innovations, we present a brief summary of the original system of Bana and Comon-Lundh as well.
Terms, Predicates, Formulas
Terms are built out of a set of function symbols F that contains an unbounded set of names N and an unbounded set of handles H. Names and handles are constants (zero-arity function symbols). We use names to denote items honestly generated by agents, while handles denote inputs of the adversary. Let X be an unbounded set of variables. A ground term is without variables.
Let P be a set of predicate symbols over terms. We assume here that P contains the binary predicate = and is used as t1 = t2 and the following families of of (n + 1)-ary predicates meaning various sorts of derivability:
• t1, ..., tn£nt for derivability of the rhs from the lhs • t1, ..., tn £ aic2 n t for derivability of the rhs from the lhs with access to IND-CCA2 oracles in asymmetric case • t1, ..., tn £ sic2 n t for derivability of the rhs from the lhs with access to IND-CCA2 oracles in symmetric case • t1, ..., tn £ akc2 n t for derivability of the rhs from the lhs with access to KDM-CCA2 oracles in asymmetric case • t1, ..., tn £ skc2 n t for derivability of the rhs from the lhs with access to KDM-CCA2 oracles in symmetric case and the following key compromise predicates:
• t1, ..., tn We always drop the index n: t1, ..., tn £ O t and t1, ..., tn O K.
SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
In case of the Dolev-Yao adversary, derivability predicates would have fixed interpretations. For example, £ holds in case of a DY adversary, if the right-hand side can be computed from the left-hand side with the DY rules. However, for the symbolic execution, the BC technique allows any interpretation of the predicates (including =) that does not contradict some axioms (introduced later).
Accordingly, let M be any first-order structure that interprets the function and predicate symbols of the logic. We denote by DM the domain of interpretation, and by
, and = respectively. Given an assignment σ of elements in DM to the free variables of term t, we write
M is the unique extension of σ into a homomorphism of F-algebras). For any first-order formula θ, for any first-order structure M over the functions F and predicates P, and any assignment σ of the free variables of θ in the domain of M, the satisfaction relation M, σ |= θ is defined as usual in first-order logic from the satisfaction of predicates.
Protocols
Bana and Comon-Lundh set up their technique to be convenient for constraint-solving methods as in [16] .
Let Q be a set of control states (not necessarily finite). A protocol is a recursive set of tuples ((q, n), (q , n, n ), x1, ..., xm , x, ψ, s)
where q, q ∈ Q, x1, ..., xm, x are variables (into which agents read messages from the adversary), n, n are disjoint finite sequences of names (corresponding to honestly generated items such as keys, nonces). ψ is some formula corresponding to agent checks on incoming messages. For example, ψ can be a formula such as dec(x, k) = n, checking whether the input decrypts to a previously generated nonce n. ψ is over the variables {x1, ..., xm, x}, the names n, the function symbols F without the rest of the names and handles, and some subset of the predicate symbols P. Finally, s is the output message, when the transition succeeds. s is built from the variables {x1, ..., xm, x}, the names n, n , and the function symbols F without the rest of the names and handles.
Execution of a Protocol and Attacks
In applied π-calculus, frames are sequences of terms with name binders: a frame φ can be written νn. p1 → t1, ..., pn → tn where p1, ...pn are place holders that do not occur in t1, ..., tn and n is a sequence of names, but we think of a frame simply as a list of terms t1, ..., tn representing the messages that agents have sent over the network, that is, messages that the adversary has seen. The names, variables of φ are the names, variables of t1, ..., tn.
A symbolic state of the network consists of:
• a control state q ∈ Q together with a sequence of names (randomly) generated so far, n1, ..., n k • a sequence of constants called handles h1, ..., hn (recording the attacker's inputs) • a ground frame φ (the agents outputs)
• a set of closed formulas Θ (all conditions that must be satisfied in order to reach the state).
A symbolic transition sequence of a protocol Π is a sequence
If necessary, some renaming of the sequence αi+1 ensures the freshness of the names n:
Examples of symbolic executions can be found in [7] and [5] .
Symbolic Satisfaction of Formulas
M modeled, among others, the predicate t1, ..., tn £ t. In executions we also consider a predicate that we write asφ, t1, ..., tn £ t. This is also an n + 1-arity predicate.φ is just a symbol, not an argument, and it represents the frame containing the messages that protocol agents sent out, that is, the information available from the protocol to the adversary. We also use a number of different constraints: Handle(h) means h is a handle, RanGen(x) means that x was honestly, randomly generated (i.e. appears in the n of the control state); x φ means that x is a subterm of a message sent out by an agent (i.e. listed in the frame φ), x x means x is subterm of x. dK dφ means dK occurs somewhere other than in a decryption position dec( , dK) in φ, and dK d x is analogous (dK may also occur in a decryption position in x, but it has to occur elsewhere too) 2 . Similarly, let K edφ mean that symmetric key K occurs somewhere other than in an encryption or decryption position (as {|_|}K or sdec( , K)) in φ, and K ed x is analogous (K may also 2 In this paper, we will use the notation {x} R eK and dec(y, dK) for both symmetric and asymmetric encryptions with random input R, where in the symmetric case, eK = dK = K. We use {|x|} R K and sdec(y, K) for symmetric encryption and decryption only. occur in encryption or decryption position in x, but it has to occur elsewhere too). Let us introduce the following abbreviations:
• keyfresh(K;φ, x) for asymmetric key:
Where p runs through all permutations of 1, ..., n. Further, for symmetric encryption we also require for x φ , x that if any R is a random input of an encryption inφ, x, x then the only way it can appear in x is within that same encryption. If M is a first-order model, satisfaction of predicates and constraints in a symbolic execution (denoted by | s = ) is defined recursively: Let n = (n1, ..., n k ) be a list of names and φ = t1, ..., tm a list of closed terms. Let σ be a substitution of free variables of the rhs of | s = with elements in the domain of M.
• Satisfactions of predicates by M, σ, n, φ (depends on M):
• Satisfactions of constraints by M, σ, n, φ are independent of M and σ so we define them as satisfaction by n, φ:
φ if t is a subterm of some ti -t s1, ..., sn, where s1, ..., sn, t are closed terms:
n, φ | s = t s1, ..., sn if t is a subterm of some si
• Satisfaction of any FOL formula by M, σ, n, φ:
-θ1 ∧θ2, θ1 ∨θ2, and ¬θ are interpreted as usual in FOL.
-If x is not under a constraint in θ, interpretations of ∀xθ and ∃xθ are defined as usual in FOL.
We say there is a successful symbolic attack against the security property θ (a first-order formula) of the protocol if there is a model M and state of an execution ((q, n), h1, ..., hm , φm, Θ) such that M, ((q, n), h1, ..., hm , φm, Θ) | s = ¬θ holds, and moreover, M, ((q, n), h1, ..., hm , φm, Θ) also satisfies the computationally sound axioms that we introduce in the rest of the paper. This is the same as saying that there is a successful symbolic attack if at a certain point of some symbolic execution, the axioms, the agent checks and the negation of the security property are all consistent.
COMPUTATIONAL EXECUTION
We now summarize the computational semantics. Short proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 are in the Section 6 using Fitting's embedding of classical logic into S4 [23] .
Computational Execution
Following Bana and Comon, we consider a family of computational algebras, parametrized by a security parameter η, in which each function symbol is interpreted as a polynomially computable function on bit strings (that may return an error message). Given a sample τ of names, every ground term t can be interpreted as a bit string
τ is a homomorphism of F-algebras (a name n is interpreted as a bit string τ (n)). More generally, if σ is an assignment of the variables of t to bit strings,
σ τ is the (unique) extension of τ (on names) and σ (on variables) as a homomorphism of F-algebras.
Given a set of transition rules, a computational state consists of
• a sequence of bit strings b1, ..., bm (attacker outputs)
• a sequence b 1 , ..., b m of bit strings (agents' outputs)
• the configuration γ of the attacker.
Given a PPT interactive Turing machine M c and a sample τ , a sequence of transitions
is (computationally) valid with respect to M c and τ if
and γ i is in a sending state, the sending tape containing bi+1, γi+1 is in a receiving state, the receiving tape containing b i+1
• for all i = 0, ..., m−1, the bit strings τ , {h1 → b1, ..., hi+1 → bi+1} satisfy all agent checks listed in Θi+1.
Here * M means what the machine (in whatever model it is defined) can compute via a sequence of computational steps.
Computational satisfaction of formulas
We recall the computational interpretation of the original predicates, = and £ here and the semantics of compound formulas. The difference between our presentation here and that of [6] is that we do not assume any computability condition on non-negligible sets any more, as we apply a trick in the soundness proof that makes it unnecessary. Interpretations of the new predicates are presented in later sections.
Let (Ω0, Σ0, p0) be the probability space of infinite fair coin tosses, Ω0 the the set of infinite bit strings, Σ0 the measurable sets generated by fixing finitely many outcomes, and p0 the probability measure assigning the probabilities to the sets of Σ0. For a finite bit string b ∈ {0, 1} * of length n, letb ⊂ Ω0 denote the set of infinite bit strings for which the initial n bits are exactly b. Let Σ f be the set generated by finite unions intersections, and subtractions of sets of the formb (including Ω). Σ0 is the σ-closure of Σ f .
Let M c be an interactive PPT Turing machine with a special challenge control state q ch . We may regard this machine as an attacker, who moves to the state q ch when he thinks that he is ready to break the security property. As usual, the machine takes the security parameter 1 η as an initial input. M c interacts with the protocol agents, which are also assumed to be interactive PPT Turing machines, and they respond to the calls of the adversary. Since once η is fixed, such an execution is probabilistic, and for each security parameter η, we denote underlying probability space by (Ω η , Σ η , p η ), which is just a copy of the (Ω0, Σ0, p0) above. We denote the elements of Ω η by ω η . (Actually, the adversary's random string and the agent random strings are separate, but as there are finitely many of them, they can be thought to be on a single string) Each ω η is one particular random string. Let Ω = (Ω η ) η∈N . Let τ (ω η ) be the assignment of all fixed bit string evaluations τ (n) of names given for ω η . For a given n name, we just use simply n(ω η ) for the bit string τ (ω η )(n). By a non-negligible set of coins S, we mean S = (S η ) η∈N , where for all η ∈ N, S η ∈ Σ η f , and
In what follows, S is any such non-negligible set of coins. The domain of interpretation D(S) = D is the same for all S: PPT algorithms that take as input η, read from the random tape ω η , and output a bit string. (As ω η is infinite coin tosses, the algorithms of course do not read it all, they terminate in polynomial time. ) We recall the interpretations of = and £ from [7] : Let σ be a sequence of PPT machines (e.g. one for each free variable xi of θ):
For example, and Ax can be the evaluation of any name (in which case Ax(η, ω η ) = n(ω η ), or any value for a handle computed by the adversary, or some more complex object.
is a statement, then for any fixed S = (S η ) η∈N , instead of "for all η ∈ N and all ω η ∈ S η , st(η, ω η )", we simply write "for all ω ∈ S, st(ω)".
• For the equality predicate, M c , Π, S, σ | c = t1 = t2 iff there is a subset S ⊆ S such that S \ S is negligible, and for all
• For the derivability predicate, M c , Π, S, σ | c =φ, t1, ..., tn £t if for all non-negligible S ⊆ S, there is a non-negligible S ⊆ S and a PPT Turing machine A such that for all
where m(ω) is the step at which M c reached the challenge state, a(ω) stands for the protocol adversary's output and r(ω) is some fresh input from the random tape.
• If P is a constraint, t are closed terms then M c , Π, S, σ |= P ( t) iff there is S ⊆ S such that, S\S is negligible, and for all ω ∈ S , the unique valid computation of Π with respect to
About the fresh r(ω), note we assumed for any non-negligible set
, so there can always be fresh random bits generated inside S.
Satisfaction of compound formulas are defined the following way.
•
is a constrained variable, the interpretation of ∃x.θ is analogous to the symbolic case: M, Π, S, σ | c = ∃x.θ if and only if for every non-negligible S ⊆ S there is a nonnegligible S ⊆ S and a ground term t, such that the satisfaction M, Π, S , σ | c = θ{x → t} holds.
• If x is a constrained variable, the interpretation of ∀x.θ is analogous to the symbolic case: M, Π, S, σ | c = ∀x.θ if and only if for every ground term t, the satisfaction M, Π, S, σ | c = θ{x → t} holds.
Given a protocol Π, we say that there is a successful computational attack against the security property θ (a first-order formula) of the protocol if there is a an attacker M c and a non-negligible set
. Despite that semantics of the compound formulas is not as usual in first-order logic, we prove in Section 6 that as a consequence of Fitting's embedding [23] of classical logic into S4, the following theorems hold.
THEOREM 5.1 (FITTING'S EMBEDDING).
With the above semantics, first-order deduction rules are sound. 
THEOREM 5.3 (GENERAL SOUNDNESS).
If there is a successful computational attack such that the number of sessions of honest agents are bounded in the security parameter, then there is also a successful symbolic attack.
Axioms for Equality and Derivability
We recall the core axioms presented in [5] . As usual, unquantified variables are universally quantified. Unless noted otherwise, they are always sound.
Equality is a Congruence:
• x = x, and the substitutability (congruence) property of equal terms holds for = and £. Core Axioms for the Derivability Predicate:
• Self derivability:φ, x, x £ x • Increasing capabilities:φ,
This axiom is sound as long as functions are interpreted as PT computable algorithms.
Axioms for Freshly Generated Items:
• No telepathy: fresh(x;φ) −→φ £ x This axiom is sound as long as RanGen() items are generated so that they can only be guessed with negligible probability. A more general version is also possible as fresh(x;φ, x) ∧ x φ −→φ, x £ x • Fresh items do not help to compute:
fresh(x;φ, x, y) ∧ x, y φ ∧φ, x, x £ y −→φ, x £ y Equations for the fixed function symbols: For example, for symmetric encryption sdec({|x|} R K , K) = x, and for pairing, π1 ( x, y ) = x; π2 ( x, y ) = y. Function of error is error f (..., ⊥, ...) = ⊥, etc.
THE FITTING CONNECTION
The trace mapping and the general soundness theorems for arbitrary first-order formulas were proven directly from their definitions by an elaborate argument in [6] . We have realized however, that they are rather easy consequences of Fitting's embedding of first-order logic into first-order S4 [23] . The non-Tarskian computational semantics of first-order formulas that naturally arouse in the BC technique turns out to be a special kind of Kripke semantics of first-order S4 composed with Fitting's embedding of FOL into first-order S4. We detail this connection here, and show how trace mapping and general soundness follow from Fitting's theorem. This section assumes basic familiarity with S4 modal logic and its first-order extension as well as Kripke semantics.
For any first-order formula θ, consider the Fitting transformation θ → θ * , where θ * is a formula of first-order S4, and is defined recursively as follows:
• For any atomic formula θ, let θ * ≡ PQθ.
Fitting in [23] put PQ everywhere and noted that it is redundant in front of the conjunction. It is also easy to check that if the Barcan formula and its converse (∀xPθ ↔ P∀xθ) are assumed (that is, when the domain does not change from possible world to possible world in the Kripke structure), then PQ is also redundant in front of the universal quantification (as θ * ↔ PQθ * holds in our definitions for all θ). In our computational situation the domain is unchanged as we show below. So in this paper we assume the Barcan formula and its converse.
Fitting's theorem says that any formula θ is derivable in firstorder logic if and only if θ * it is derivable in S4 with the Barcan formulas. (Without the Barcan formulas, (∀xθ) * ≡ PQ∀xθ * has to be written above).
Observe that if we think of non-negligible sets as possible worlds, and the subset relation as accessibility (that is, if S is accessible from S iff S ⊆ S), then we can define a computational Kripke semantics: For our predicates, consider the S4 satisfaction relation M c , Π, S, σ | s4 = that we define almost the same way as the BC computational satisfaction | c = of Section 5.2 is defined, except that we drop the "for all non-negligible S ⊆ S, there is a non-negligible S ⊆ S " phrase, and replace S with S in the remaining of the definition. For example, the satisfaction of derivability becomes:
• For the derivability predicate, M c , Π, S, σ | s4 =φ, t1, ..., tn £t if there is a PPT Turing machine A such that for all ω ∈ S,
where m(ω) is the step at which M c reached the challenge state, a(ω) stands for the protocol adversary's output and r(ω) is some fresh input from the random string. 
τ (ω) holds on S , then it also holds up to negligible probability on S, because if there were a non-negligible subset S ⊆ S on which
were true, then this S would not have some non-negligible subset S on which they are equal, a contradiction. So BC could have defined satisfaction of equality as 
For a set of first-order formulas Φ, let Φ * mean the set that we get by applying the Fitting transformation to all formulas in Φ. Since with | The Barcan formula and its converse hold, as the domain D does not depend on the non-negligible sets.
For Theorem 5.2, note that it is assumed in the theorem that for all ω ∈ S the computational execution has the same length m and the symbolic part of their traces, si agree. Remember that the symbolic states have the transition conditions Θi in them. So at the challenge state, we have M c , Π, S | c = Θm ∧ Φ. Note that since on the traces, si agree, the terms that are in the frame also agree for all trace ω ∈ S. Therefore,φ in the formulas of θm and Φ can be replaced by the list of terms in the frames. Let θ m and Φ denote the formulas we receive this way. Then,
This is the same as
* is S4 satisfiable). Hence there is a symbolic model M with
As Θ m and Φ have no frames in them, it is easy to see from the symbolic satisfaction that M, sm | s = Θ m ∧ Φ is also satisfied as satisfaction does not depend on the state. Finally, as in sm, the frames contain exactly the terms with which we replaced φ, we can now write them back and receive M, sm | s = Θm ∧ Φ. Which also means that Θm and Φ are first-order consistent.
Finally, for proving Theorem 5.3, consider the following. If there is a computational attack, that is, if the negation of the security formula θs is computationally satisfied by some M c , Π, S, then, as long as only bounded number (in the security parameter) of sessions are allowed, the maximum number of different (with respect to ω) symbolic transitions s1 → · · · → sm does not depend on the security parameter. Therefore, S can be split (up to negligible probability) into a fixed number of non-negligible subsets on each of which s1 → · · · → sm is independent of ω. Pick one, call it S . Then M c , Π, S computationally satisfies ¬θs as well as all computationally sound axioms (denote the set by ΦA), and Θm also:
Note, although by Fitting's theorem, the first-order deduction rules are computationally sound, it is not possible in the current formulation to deduce security properties from the axioms only by first-order deduction rules and nothing else. The BC technique has no formulas expressing the transition system, no formulas saying the agents follow the protocol roles. Explicit time and some axiom for induction would also be needed as in [8] . These are taken care by the symbolic execution.
DERIVABILITY WITH ORACLES
Syntax of various types of derivability with oracles was introduced in Section 3. Here we define their computational semantics and list a number of axioms that are computational sound.
Computational Semantics of Derivability with Oracles
Let O sic2 be the following oracle: It first takes a list of honestly generated keys K and some additional list C of ciphertexts. The oracle can be called for encryption by submitting a string to encrypt along with the encrypting key's place number in K. The oracle honestly generates the desired encryption, returns the result and adds it to the list C. The oracle can also be called for a decryption again with specifying the key and providing a ciphertext. If the ciphertext is not one of those in C, the oracle outputs the decryption. Let O skc2 take K and C as above, but also τ (L) assignment of bit strings to a finite set of name symbols L. The oracle accepts descriptions of functions of the names L, the ciphers C and the keys K, into which he substitutes the corresponding bit strings, computes the function and then encrypts the result with the specified key and adds it to C. Decryption works as for O sic2 . Let O aic2 and O akc2 be the analogous notions for public key encryption. PPT algorithms with oracle access will be written as A can request encryption and decryption oracles corresponding to the honest keys, but it will only receive a decryption if the submitted bit string is not a bit string corresponding to an encryption inφ, x or a bit string received from the encryption oracle. Outside S, nothing is required. DEFINITION 7.1. Semantics of Derivability with Oracles: Let M c , Π, S, σ be as before. Let a(ω η ) denote the protocol adversary output as it reaches the challenge state on the random input ω η , and let m(ω η ) denote the number of moves till then. We write
where r(ω) is some fresh (not used for the computation ofφ, x, x) random input from the random string. On each ω, if the tuple (((q, n) , h, φ, Θ), b, b , γ) denotes the state yielded by the unique valid computation of Π with respect to M c and τ (ω), then the oracles receive in K all keys (bit strings) corresponding to the keys in n, and in C all strings of the form [[{z} φ , x. In τ (L), the KDM oracles receive all assignments of names inn to bit strings, except (in the symmetric case), for those that occur as random inputs R to the encryptions in C. We shorten this as
implicitly assuming the algorithm has access to the protocol adversary's knowledge and to random bits. Let
In the KDM case, the submitted functions may depend on randomly generated items that differ from the secret keys but are not accessible to the protocol adversary. For example, it is allowed to depend on a secret nonce. This is necessary for receiving nice axioms for the KDM case, and we explain the reason at the axioms. Still, assuming the usual KDM security is enough to prove that an unsent key is uncompromised with such oracle access. The reason is that when a KDM attack is constructed from the protocol attack, the KDM attacker has access to the items generated by honest agents except for the secret keys and the random inputs to the encryptions.
Axioms for Derivability with Oracles
The following axioms (except for the second and last entry of the core axioms for derivability predicates) are very similar to the ones in Section 5.3, and are just as trivial. The second entry of the core axioms for derivability predicates with oracles is also trivially computationally sound.
Core Axioms for the Derivability Predicate with Oracles.
• Let SameEnc( x; y) be the constraint that there is a one-toone correspondence between the honest encryption terms of x and y such that the corresponding encryption terms are equal (with respect to the equality predicate). Then
• More oracles help more: If the oracles of O are more powerful than the oracles of O , thenφ,
This expresses that if y is computable and is not an encryption inφ, x, then dec(y, dK) is also computable from the same items as the decryption oracle can be called. We do not have to require that y is none of the encryptions done by the oracles, because if they were, then the decryption is known to the submitter. Again, this follows purely from the definition of £ O , CCA2 security of the encryption is not required. This axiom together with the transitivity axiom easily imply
This replaces the non-malleability axiom of [5] for the derivability predicate. With tiny modifications, it is possible to rewrite the NSL proof presented in [5] for using the £ O predicate and this simpler axiom instead of the £ predicate with the non-malleability axiom there. Axioms for Freshly Generated Items. These axioms are sound for the same reason as the corresponding ones for £ were:
(implies no-telepathy axiom without oracles). This is sound as long as RanGen() means generation with negligible guessing probability only.
• Fresh items do not help to compute:
x is implied by the more oracles help more axiom and the self-derivability axiom of derivability predicate. Also,φ, x£
KEY USABILITY
Syntax of various types of key usability was introduced in Section 3. Here we define their computational semantics and list a number of axioms that are computational sound.
IND-CCA2 and KDM-CCA2 cases

Semantics of IND-CCA2 Key Compromise
The idea of key usability is that a key has been uncompromised, that is, it can be used for safe encryption. To match the computability predicate, we define the negation of it, key compromise. The intuitive meaning ofφ, x O K is thatφ, x compromises the key (with oracles) and it cannot be used for safe encryption any more.
The first thought here would be to define the compromise so that fromφ, x, an x can be computed such that the encryption of x and of 0 |x| are computationally distinguishable. However, the major difficulty here (and the major difference from [22] ) is that we have to define our notion for any S. Computational distinguishability on an arbitrary set has no meaning: even in the usual CCA2 game with CCA2 secure encryption, there can be non-negligible sets of coins defined on which the CCA2 attacker returns 1 if the real bit string is encrypted, while 1 with probability 1/2 if the 0's are encrypted; it is very easy to find sets like this.
What we came up with is a notion of observational inequivalence: encryptions of x and 0 |x| have to be observationally inequivalent on S, where PPT algorithms with oracle access provide the contexts and equality on S provides the equivalence. • R is generated honestly, statistically independently of the interpretations ofφ,
) and for some (hence for all) R fresh random input generated inside S,
In the KDM case
• R is generated honestly, statistically independently of the interpretations ofφ, x, x, and
Recall from Section 6 that PQ means "there is a non-negligible S ⊆ S such that for all S ..." Also note that as we required our non-negligible sets to be in Σ f , it is always possible to toss fresh coins inside the non-negligible sets. Note that while R does not have to be generated inside S, R does. In particular, S may actually depend on R, which is essential for the usability of the axioms, because the non-negligible sets on which we need to apply the axioms may depend on values of an encryption, and hence values of R. On the other hand, S is not allowed to depend on R , which is essential for proving that a freshly generated key is not compromised.
Note, in the KDM case, x does not have to be computed from φ, x, it could be a secret nonce. This corresponds to the fact that in the semantics of £ O in the KDM case (as we noted after the definition) we allowed the functions submitted to the oracles to depend on such items not known to the protocol adversary.
Axioms for CCA2 Key Compromise
We now present the axioms for key compromise. First the core axioms for which soundness does not need CCA2 security.
Core Axioms for the Key Compromise Predicate.
• Let SameEnc( x; y) be the constraint as before. Then
• Derivability implies compromise:φ, 
The intuitive reason is very clear: y just contains extra information, that can be computed fromφ, x, so it is not actually needed in the compromise. This, and the functions are derivable axiom implyφ,
With the increasing capabilities axiom, we getφ,
We refer to these as function application.
• Uncompromised keys securely encrypt:
-If O is either aic2 or sic2, then
This formula means that if the key is uncompromised, that is,φ, x, x O K, then {x} φ ensures that handles in these terms are given values the adversary can compute (otherwise e.g. taken x = h, the handle h cannot be dK if dK was never sent, and it cannot be R either). This formula is completely analogous to the secrecy axiom in [5] but dK φ , x, x there is replaced now witĥ φ, x, x aic2 K as we can now allow dK to appear inside a secure encryption for example.
-If O is either akc2 or skc2, then
The difference here from the axiom for IND-CCA2 security is that inφ, x O K now there is no x. This corresponds to the fact that the encrypted message x is allowed to contain the decryption key, or it may leak it somehow together withφ, x. For more, see Section 11.
It may be surprising however, that these core axioms do not require any security of the encryption. It is purely a consequence of the definition of key compromise and derivability predicates. (The axiom that requires CCA2 security is the fresh keys are uncompromised axiom later.) Here we want to allow x to be any secret thing, such as a nonce, so only x φ was assumed. That is why in the KDM definition of key compromise we needed to allow functions depending on such secret items to be submitted to the encryption oracles in the semantics of £ O and O .
• Encryptions with uncompromised keys do not compromise:
That is, ifφ, x, {x} R eK compromised K, then either K is already compromised without {x} R eK , or K was already compromised byφ, x, x. Note that this includes x, the encrypted term. This means that x itself (witĥ φ, x) should not compromise K if we want {x} R eK to be safe. This is the generalization of that key cycles may compromise CCA2 encryption. In Section 11 we will see how this axiom deals with key cycles.
-KDM-CCA2 case. If O is akc2 or skc2, then
This is basically the same as the previous one, except again thatφ, x K does not contain x.
Again, soundness of these axioms follow directly from the definition of key usability, and it does not depend on what encryption is used.
In the above formulas, K and K could be allowed to encrypt different kinds of encryptions, not necessarily the same, we just did not want to overload our formulas.
• Axioms for Freshly Generated Items.
-Fresh keys are not compromised: The intuition of this axiom is that if K is fresh, then it can be used for secure encryption: keyfresh(K;φ, x)∧ x φ −→φ, x O K This axiom is sound if the encryption for which K is generated is CCA2 secure. Depending on which O is in the axiom, the encryption needs to have the corresponding level of security. This is the only axiom where the security of the encryption is necessary. The reader may wonder that proving the KDM case, what happens to the variables not known to the protocol adversary in the submitted functions as the standard KDM encryption oracle only fills in the gaps of keys, not other unknown items. However, in a KDM attack created by the failure of the axiom, the attacker simulates the protocol, and all honestly generated items except for the keys and random inputs to the encryptions in question are available to him. -Fresh items do not compromise: they were generated independently and as they have not been sent out, they have not had a chance to compromise other items: 
is not equal any of the outputs of the encryption oracles, and it is not any of the bit strings corresponding to the honest encryptions inφ,
The reason for using oracle O sic2 is that the definition of INT-CTXT security [13] allows the use of encryption and decryption oracles.
Axioms for Unforgeability Key Compromise
SameEnc( x; y) ∧ x,x = y,y −→ (φ, x ic x ↔φ, y ic y).
• Derivability implies compromise:φ, x £ K −→φ, x ic K • Increasing capabilities for key compromise:
This means the adversary cannot compute a y which decrypts to something meaningful. This is exactly what we need from the INT-CTXT property, namely, that the encryption cannot be faked. Again, soundness of this axiom does not need INT-CTXT encryption, it is immediate from our semantics.
-For the IND case, we have
-For the KDM case, we have
Soundness of these follow from the compromise definitions.
• Fresh keys are not INT-CTXT compromised if encryption is
INT-CTXT secure:
The intuition of this axiom is that if the encryption is INT-CTXT secure and if K is fresh, then the adversary cannot fake encryptions with this key.
• Fresh items do not compromise:
ON CONGRUENCE OF EQUALITY
Note that the semantics of the equality predicate = is not defined as identity in the domain. In fact, on the left-hand sides of the predicates £ O and O , equal terms cannot be freely substituted. This might cause problems with decidability, the result in [19] heavily builds on the fact that £ is invariant under substitution with respect to equal terms. There is, however a solution if we observe that CCA2 security implies that encryptions cannot be faked: for CCA2 secure encryption schemes, we can define the semantics of φ , x £ O x such that only those ciphers are not decrypted by the decryption oracles that are necessary for the computation of
Here, when we say an encryption is necessary, we mean the encryption cannot be omitted and the number of encryptions reduced by this in the process computing [[φ, x] ]. The reason we did not define our predicates this way is that we did not want the well-definedness of our predicates depend on whether the encryption satisfies CCA2 security. But if the encryption does satisfy CCA2 security, then £ O and O can be defined in the above way and all axioms that we have listed are also valid for those new definitions, and on the top of it, = would be a congruence relation.
The symmetric Needham-Schroeder protocol proof as well as the NSL proof work either way, and we believe this issue does not make a big difference in protocol proofs in general. But for automation, the two definitions might make a big difference.
SOUNDNESS OF AXIOMS
THEOREM 10.1 (SOUNDNESS). With the computational interpretations of derivability and key compromise predicates, the axioms are computationally sound. For the "fresh keys are not compromised", it is necessary that the implementation of the encryption satisfies the corresponding (symmetric or asymmetric, IND or KDM-CCA2 security, or INT-CTXT unforgeability). Soundness of the other axioms do not require that. Furthermore, the no-telepathy axiom requires that freshly generated items are guessable only with negligible probability.
Note, unlike for general soundness (Theorem 5.3), here the number of sessions in the computational execution does not have to be bounded in the security parameter.
We detail the proofs in the IND case, the KDM case is sketched, details will be included in the long version.
PROOF. As the soundness proofs of the axioms for derivability with oracles are essentially the same as the soundness proofs below, we skip that and focus on key compromise.
• Substitutability of equal terms: The reason is that according to the definition of key compromise, compromise of the item on the right hand side of O only depends on the bit string that is associated to the term there, and not on the structure of the term. This is in contrast with the left hand side. The notion that anything can be submitted to the decryption oracle that is not an encryption on the left clearly depends on the term structure on the left, so we have to make sure that in x and y the same encryption values occur.
• Derivability implies compromise: Soundness of this axiom is rather trivial, but we write it out for clarity. In order to show that in any protocol execution and n.n. set S, we have
, by the computational semantics we have to show that for any evaluation σ of the variables, and for any S ⊆ S non-negligible set, 
where O is either aic2 or sic2. Soundness of this follows easily from our definition of key compromise and derivability with oracle access. Note that CCA2 security of the encryption is not needed in the following argument. We movê φ, x £ O y to the premise, it becomesφ, x £ O y. Let us denote by θ the premise received this way. We have to show that for any σ evaluation of free variables and S non-negligible set, if . As this was y with non-negligible probability for R, it is also y with non-negligible probability for R , because y does not depend on either of them, and because the random inputs of the algorithms are required to be fresh. Hence R is just as good an independent item as R was. So there is a S ⊆ S such that 
x, x) = y. Now observe, that since x was PPT generated, for any non-negligible S, there must be a length function (η) such that the probability that |x| = (η) is non-negligible on S. This, means that A is also allowed to use. x can be one of the elements in y.
• Next, we have to show that encryptions with uncompromised keys do not compromise. Note again in the proof below that we do not need CCA2 security of the encryption, we only need the definition of key compromise. Instead of the original formula, we show the following in the IND-CCA2 case:
We have to show that for all S non-negligible sets and σ evaluations of variables, if M c , Π, S, σ satisfies the premise, then it satisfies the conclusion as well. So let us suppose it satisfies the premise. We want to conclude M c , Π, S, σ | 
, we have that there is an R , and a subset (by restricting R ) S ⊆ S such that on S , , we get that there is an R , a subset S ⊆ S just by restricting R , such that
, still for all R . Again, there is a length function (η) such that the probability that |x| = (η) is non-negligible on S . Let the subset of S on which they are equal be S . Since 0 is easily computable, we get that there are algorithms A
If we switch = and =, we receive the proof of the other case of key compromise. Here too, the KDM case is proven entirely analogously.
• Fresh keys are not compromised: It is here where IND-CCA2
(or KDM-CCA2) security of the encryption is used. We define our CCA2 attacker against the CCA2 oracle that allows multiple submissions for encryptions, which is equivalent with the original definition [11] . Let us consider the IND-CCA2 case. What we have to prove is that if M c , Π, S, σ
That is, for every S ⊆ S, there are S ⊆ S , etc. such that (consider the first case),
on S . Note that keyfresh(K;φ, x) ∧ x φ means the decryption key or any function of it was never used inφ, x. What the CCA2 attacker has to do is to simulate the protocol execution such that -except for K, the CCA2 attacker generates all keys -encryptions (except for that of A -because of (5) and (6) on S , if the correct bit string was encrypted, the two computations are equal, and if the 0's were encrypted, the two are different.
However, the attacker does not necessarily know when he is inside S and when outside. Outside S the attacker cannot be sure that equality means the correct encryption was encrypted. To overcome this problem, we finish the above CCA2 attack the following way. Let µ(η) be a function (in the security parameter) of natural numbers.
-the adversary submits pairs of 0
(φ, x)| for encryption µ times. Let ci denote (i = 1, ..., µ) the encryptions received back from the oracle. Note that these encryptions are known to be encryptions of 0
) for all i = 1, ..., µ, then the CCA2 attacker outputs 1, meaning that his guess is that the oracle encrypted the correct bit string. -CASE 2: otherwise, the adversary tosses a coin and outputs the result.
We can think of the probability space of the CCA2 attack as {0, 1} × Ω η , where {0, 1} represents the internal bit of the oracles. Even if the internal bit is 0, the simulation of the protocol execution can be done according to the above rules. Let Sµ ⊆ Ω be the set where
.., µ, (that is, CASE 1 happens when the real plaintext is encrypted in the CCA2 attack). Note that Sµ depends on the function µ, but still, S ⊆ Sµ, so Sµ is also non-negligible. Suppose, the internal bit of the oracle is 1. Then, on Sµ, according to our setup of the CCA2 attacker, he outputs 1, giving the correct guess. That is, denoting by ACCA2 the CCA2 attacker as described above, the output of ACCA2 is 1 on {1} × Sµ. On {1} × (Ω \ Sµ), ACCA2 tosses a coin, so the probabilities there balance out. Consider now {0} × Ω. Here the internal bit of the oracles is 0, that is they encrypt the 0's, that is, here c0 is the encryption of 0's. If the probability on
holds is negligible, then we are done, because on {0} × Ω too a coin is tossed, so the advantage of the adversary is 1/2 · Prob{{1} × Sµ}, which is non-negligible. So let us assume now that the probability that , ci) ) holds with the same probability for all i on {0} × Ω. For each fixed η, the higher µ(η) we chose, the higher the probability is that one , ci) ) holds for at least one i. In fact, this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing µ(η). If it is close enough to 1, then the probability of making an error (other than the case when a coin is tossed) on {0} × Ω becomes smaller than the probability of {1} × Sµ, and hence the error probability cannot cancel out the winning probability. Since the probability of hitting the same encryption with the 0's was assumed to be nonnegligible, it is sufficient to have a polynomial µ(η) to ensure that the probability of having at least one hit is closer to 1 than the non-negligible probability of {1} × Sµ. In this case, the win on {1} × Sµ when the internal bit is 1 cannot be cancelled by the loss elsewhere, so the CCA2 attacker wins. Note, ifφ, x contains the decryption key outside S, the attack can simply terminate there and output a random bit. The proof for KDM-CCA2 is exactly analogous. The only difference is, that instead of
, there is an x there, but the oracles accept the functions to be submitted. When it comes to computing the encryptions of x, the KDM encryption oracle is requested. It is not directly x that is submitted, but a description of a function of the keys instead. Since the KDM adversary is simulating the protocol, all items except for the secret keys and the random inputs to the encryptions in the symmetric case are available to him.
• Fresh items do not compromise: The idea is exactly the same as in case of the derivability predicate. A fresh item can just as well be created by the adversary, it cannot help him.
We now turn to the case of INT-CTXT key compromise. Proofs of the first six axioms and the last one are entirely identical to the proofs for CCA2 key compromise. The soundness of the "encryptions with uncompromised keys do not compromise" axiom is also analogous: We again show the following: , such that
is not equal any of the outputs of the encryption oracles. Now, we also have that M c , Π, S , σ | c = φ, x, x sic2 K from the satisfaction of the premise. This gives us that there is some S non-negligible subset of S such that
is not equal any of the outputs of the encryption oracles. Again, as the length of x can be guessed, there is a non-negligible S ⊆ S and a B O sic2 such that
and on S , B 
Then for all S ⊆ S, there is a S ⊆ S and an algorithm A such that M c , Π, S , σ || = A(φ, x) = y. Furthermore, the last conjunct means that the output of the algorithm is not any of the encryptions inφ, x, and the third conjunct means the decryption does not fail. This is exactly means that M c , Π, S, σ | c =φ, x ic K. The only remaining axiom is the fresh keys are not compromised axiom for the INT-CTXT case. But that is rather easy. Suppose, the encryption is INT-CTXT secure.
there is a S ⊆ S, and a PT algorithm
is not equal any of the outputs of the encryption oracles. But that exactly means that there is a non-negligible set (namely S ), on which A O sic2 can produce a ciphertext, contradicting the INT-CTXT property.
SIMPLE EXAMPLES
Now let us see on a few simple examples how inconsistency can be shown with the above axioms. In [5] , the authors presented some of the most basic examples, therefore the ones we analyze here are a little more complex, all are related to sending keys around. We use symmetric encryption in these examples. 
K £
O N , we also have that either φ2 £ O N (already ruled out) or (depending on O) φ2, h2, N sic2 K or φ2 skc2 K . In the IND-CCA2 case, by the 'fresh items do not compromise' axiom, we then have φ2, h2 sic2 K as N does not appear in φ2. Since the handle is always derived from the frame, φ2 £ h2 holds, hence φ2 £ sic2 h2 and by the transitivity axiom applied for φ2, h2 sic2 K and φ2 £ sic2 h2, we have φ2 sic2 K, just as we had in the KDM case earlier. But that is the same as (now for both IND and KDM cases) φ1, {|K|} sic2 KAB, hence again we arrived at a contradiction.
It may seem to the reader that the axioms provided in [5] (that is, without key compromise) could also be sufficient to prove that φ3 £ N is inconsistent with the axioms there by removing items from φ3 in a different order from what we just did in Example 11.1. Namely, the idea would be to proceed the following way: given φ3 £ N , first remove the first encryption (by the secrecy axiom as KAB was never sent out), and receive (A, B), {|h2, N |} R 2 K £ N . Then remove the second encryption (by secrecy as K is not in the frame any more after removing the first encryption) receiving (A, B) £ N contradicting the no-telepathy axiom. However, application of the secrecy axiom in [5] (and also in this paper) to (A, B), {|h2, N |} R 2 K £ N requires h2 (A, B), which means (A, B)£h2, but that does not hold, because h2 was computed from (A, B), {|K|} R 1 K AB . Secrecy axiom can only be used if the frame contains all necessary information for the computation of handles in the plaintext. It is in fact possible to show that φ3 £ N is consistent with the axioms of [5] . Although those axioms are inconsistent with h2 £ K, they do allow h2 to carry partial information about K sufficient to compromise the second encryption. Without the handle h2 in the second encryption, the axioms of [5] are sufficient to prove inconsistency, but except for initial ones, protocol messages are normally responses to agent inputs and contain handles. K if we follow the same steps as we did in Example 11.1. Then the same way as before, we can remove h2 and N , and since φ2 ≡ φ1, {|K|} , KAB sic2 K too by the 'derivability implies compromise' axiom, there is no contradiction. However, if we have KDM security, then just as in the previous example, using the 'uncompromised key securely encrypts' axiom, φ3 £ skc2 N immediately leads to φ2 skc2 K, and the rest of the derivation is the same as in the previous example. So in this case, while φ3 £ sic2 N is consistent with the axioms, φ3 £ skc2 N is inconsistent. K . K and KAB are still in cycles, but they do not disturb each other because of K . Again, assuming IND-CCA2 security, from φ3£ sic2 N first φ2, {|KAB|} R 2 K , h2, N sic2 K is derived using the 'uncompromised key securely encrypts' axiom as in Example 11.1. As in Example 11.1, h2 and N are removed: φ2, {|KAB|} R 2 K sic2 K. At this point, the 'encryptions with uncompromised keys do not compromise' axiom implies that either φ2 sic2 K or φ2,KAB sic2 K . In the former case, we are back at the situation of Example 11.1 and we arrive at a contradiction. In the latter case, by function (encryption) application on φ1, {|K|}
, KAB sic2 K , we get φ1, K, KAB, R1 sic2 K . By 'the fresh items do not compromise' axiom, K, KAB, R1 can be removed receiving φ1 sic2 K contradicting the 'fresh keys are uncompromised' axiom.
THE SYMMETRIC NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER PROTOCOL
With the axioms that we presented, we have proven the amended symmetric Needham-Schroeder protocol:
This protocol first has a key distribution part, and then the distributed key is used to securely encrypt a nonce. We showed that no symbolic (hence computational) attacker succeeds the following way (motivated by [25] ). Using IND-CCA2 and INT-CTXT axioms, we first showed by an inductive technique that the key K from the trusted party meant for honest A and B are never corrupted (corruption is inconsistent with the axioms and agent checks). Then, again with an inductive technique we showed that N3 is never leaked. Finally, agreement and authentication were shown. Besides the presented axioms, we also needed that adding 1 and subtracting 1 are inverses of each other, and x − 1 = x. We needed an additional property, namely, that applying the first projection of a pairing on an honestly generated nonce cannot result the nonce itself with more than negligible probability. Triples, quadruples were constructed out of pairs. The detailed proof is available online at the first author's homepage. We assumed that A is running the initiator role in all his sessions, and B is running the responder's role. There is only one trusted party. They all are allowed to run any number of multiple parallel sessions with honest and corrupted agents.
On a note about dynamic corruption, the proof works even if the protocol allows the release of the key K at a later time. Secrecy can still be proven until that point, authentication that was carried out earlier can still be verified.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we further expanded the framework proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh [7] for computationally complete symbolic adversary. We have shown how key exchange can be handled. Proofs with this technique are computationally sound without the need of any further assumptions such as no bad keys, etc. that are assumed in other literature. We presented a modular set of axioms that are computationally sound for implementations using IND-CCA2, KDM-CCA2 and INT-CTXT secure encryptions respectively. We illustrated their power via simple examples and the verification of an entire protocol.
We are investigating extensions of the general soundness theorem in order to account for unbounded number of sessions and also to be able to handle indistinguishability properties. More importantly, we are also researching automation.
